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Comments should be addressed by email to the author(s). Abstract 
Middle East and North African countries (MENA) have achieved much to be proud of in human 
development.  Falling child mortality and fertility have transformed family structures in most 
MENA countries.  Despite important advances in health, education, and income, there are certain 
aspects human development in which MENA countries have not progressed as far.   There are 
inequalities in human development regionally, within each country and for specific demographic 
groups, most importantly for youth and women.  In this paper I review the record of human 
development in the MENA region to  highlight areas in which the region has been more 
successful, as well those in which human development has lagged in absolute terms or relative to 
economic growth.  I draw attention to certain important characteristics of the region that 
distinguish it from other developing regions, in particular the presence of oil income and delayed 
demographic transition.   
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Human Development Reports,  introduced in 1990, have played an important role in 
broadening the measurement of human progress from economic growth to human development.  
The HDR project has facilitated the inclusion of important human capabilities, education and 
health, in addition to income  in  the  rankings  of countries and tracking of their economic 
development.  HDRs have defined and redefined the concept of human development (Alkire 
2009), adding other capabilities, such as personal freedom and human rights, to the measurement 
of human development, informing a wider set of policies.  While the summary cross-country 
rankings have been confined to the three key indicators, various country and regional reports 
have probed human development deeper and broader.   
Five acclaimed, in-depth studies for the Arab countries ---Arab Human Development Reports, 
2002 through 2005, and 2009--- as well as more than a dozen individual country reports have 
pushed the human development agenda in the MENA region in important new directions, such as 
gender and human rights.   In this paper I review the record of human development in the MENA 
region using the evidence contained in these reports, as well as in international data sets and the 
literature at large.  I highlight areas in which the region has been more successful, as well those 
in which human development has lagged in absolute terms or relative to economic growth.   
There are certain features of the MENA region that distinguish it from the rest of the developing 
world  and  that  affect  how we evaluate human development in the region.  In addition to 
reviewing the general trends in human development, I will highlight a few salient characteristics 
of MENA economies that shape human development in the region, namely: 2 
 
•  High  income  from hydrocarbon exports,  which drive a wedge between individual 
productivity and consumption. 
•  Demographic factors, such as delayed fertility transition  and rapid  growth  of  youth 
population. 
•  Imbalances in the labor markets, evidenced by high rates of youth unemployment and 
low participation of women in the labor market. 
•  High investment in schooling but with low productivity of education. 
These phenomena are highly interconnected.  For example, the rapidly growing youth population 
increases youth unemployment; the abundance of oil income leads to large public sectors as the 
principal destinations for educated youth, which results in high demand for diplomas but not 
productivity;  and low productivity of education leads to high rates of unemployment for 
educated youth.  Together these phenomena have shaped human development in the region in 
ways that is not easily picked up by the human development index, though they are well 
documented in the more in-depth regional and country reports.    
While I discuss MENA countries as a group, I am fully aware of the region’s high degree of 
heterogeneity in most aspects of human development.  Disparities in per capita income, due to 
differences in endowments of oil and gas resources are well known.  There are in addition large 
disparities in health and education, some of which are related to income while others result from 
differences in institutions, such as the degree of reliance on markets and the effectiveness of 
public services.  However, as I argue below, there are enough similarities between the countries 
of the region in terms of common language and culture to warrant studying their human 
development in one report. 3 
 
In the case of oil rich countries, the broader coverage of human development reports –e.g., in 
health and education – has adjusted the lopsided view that simple international per capita income 
comparisons tend to promote.  But deeper issues related to the gap between riches without rising 
productivity require more detailed, region-specific analysis.  For example, while oil income has 
enabled the oil-rich countries to improve average outcomes in education and health, its effect on 
women and youth has been more mixed.  For example, in many oil-rich countries of the region 
rising incomes have  expanded  education of women faster than men without narrowing the 
gender gap in employment.  But, the narrowing and even disappearance of the gender gaps in 
education and health has not meant greater gender equality in the family, the labor market, or the 
wider society (AHDR 2005, World Bank 2004a).  Similarly, greater access to education has not 
meant greater access to jobs for the educated youth.  Rising incomes from oil have increased the 
attraction of well-paid government jobs that are rationed based on university degrees rather than 
productivity, leaving their youth trapped in long queues for these jobs instead of investing in 
productive investment in human capital.  These difficulties exist in non-oil rich countries of the 
region, where women and youth face challenging conditions in employment and social inclusion, 
though in the case of these countries human development rankings are more informative because 
their incomes reflect more closely their level of productivity and overall development.  
HDRs rightly highlight women’s welfare as an important dimension of human development.  
In the MENA region, youth issues should also receive special attention because youth is an 
demographic group whose needs differ from children and adults.  In some MENA countries, 
youth unemployment rates are 4-5 times higher than adult unemployment rates, compared to 2 or 
3 times in other regions.  In several oil-rich and oil-poor nations of the region youth are the most 
educated segment of the population, yet they suffer greater exclusion from economic and civic 4 
 
life  (Dhillon and Yousef 2009), a phenomenon that  the HDI calculus  does  not adequately 
capture.    
The plan of this report is as follows. The next section will review the special characteristics 
of human development in the MENA  region.  Section  3  discusses the record of human 
development  in the region according to HDI and GDP per capita.  Section 4  views human 
development issues from the perspective of the region’s youth; section 5 discusses the gender 
gap in human development, highlighting the fact that despite impressive gains in health and 
education, women in MENA have low rates of labor force participation in the labor market.  
Section 6 discusses the role of poverty and inequality of income in human development. 
2.  Characteristics of Middle East Economic Development 
Because of wide disparities in income, the countries of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
form a heterogeneous group of countries from the standpoint of per capita income.  Therefore, it 
is important that the discussion of their human development, of which income is the most 
important determinant, be conducted with three groups of countries in mind.  The oil-rich GCC 
countries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia) along with Libya enjoy high levels of 
per capita income.    This group accounts  for  only 9 percent of the region’s  725 million 
population.
1  A second group, by far the largest, consists of middle income countries, including 
oil exporters Iran and Iraq, and accounts for 78 percent of total MENA population.  The third 
group, which accounts for the remaining 13 percent,  consists  of the three lowest income 
countries of the region -- Djibouti, Sudan, and Yemen.   5 
 
As Table 2 shows, the low income MENA countries, with a (population weighted) average 
per capita GDP of only $1,880 in 2007 Purchasing Power Parity, are poorer than the average 
Sub-Saharan African country.  The middle income group enjoys an average per capita GDP 
which is four times as high ($7,842), which  is similar to Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC).  The average GDP per capita of the high income group is 3.5 times higher than the 
previous group ($26,959), placing it in the range of incomes for advanced countries.   With such 
vast differences in income, in discussing human development we must distinguish between these 
groups of MENA countries.   
Despite disparities in income, the region enjoys a fair degree of homogeneity in other 
respects and is well integrated  historically and culturally.  A common language (Arabic) 
connects the vast majority of the region’s population, while a common resource (oil), which 
directly or indirectly boosts incomes across the region, bonds its economies together.  These 
commonalities ease the flow of wealth, human capital, and labor throughout the region, helping 
to shape an even more integrated future for MENA.   
The countries of the MENA region also share similarities in demography.  Although fertility 
transition is well under way in all MENA countries  and in several countries,  notably  Iran, 
Lebanon, Tunisia, and the UAE, fertility has reached replacement level, for the region as a whole 
fertility transition has been slow (see Table 3).   Transition to lower fertility is the most important 
and empirically consistent correlate of economic development.  Recent economic development 
theory considers the change in the function of the family from procreators to producers of human 
capital as the most important factor for transition to modern economic growth (Becker 1992, 
Lucas 2002).    Fertility transition is highly correlated with child health and education  and 6 
 
women’s empowerment.  It allows greater participation in economic and civic life for women, 
which increases their power inside the family and improves the allocation of family resources in 
the direction of health and education and in favor of girls (Thomas and Strauss 1995, World 
Bank 2007).   
The relationship between average country income and fertility that one observes globally 
does not seem to hold for MENA in part due to the region’s oil wealth and in part due to resilient 
social norms that affect women’s participation in work outside the home (Salehi-Isfahani 2006).  
Large inflows of oil money imply that average incomes rise above productivity and therefore the 
opportunity cost of time, which is an important reason why fertility is lower in richer countries, 
does not increase in tandem with GDP per capita.  This factor can explain the delayed transition 
in countries of the region that directly or indirectly depend on rent income from oil.  For these 
countries, income per person is not a sufficient statistic for the quality of life.   
As in the rest of the world, an important reason for the decline in fertility has been improved 
health and education, especially of women and children.  In this regard, the delayed fertility 
decline in some of the oil-rich countries, despite their achievements in health and education, 
raises interesting questions about the role of oil riches in human development as distinct from 
growth of incomes.  In the GCC countries, gender equity has failed to keep pace with rising 
incomes.  In Oman and Saudi Arabia, in particular, given their GDP per capita, fertility is very 
high.  Economic growth in these countries is yet to transform women’s status from the traditional 
role of mothers and wife to that of a full citizen.  This incongruity between high income and 
gender inequality is often blamed on Islam, but as Ross (2006) has argued, it is more likely 
caused by the high share of oil income than religion.  Either way, the delay in fertility transition 7 
 
and change in women’s status are easy to measure  and  should figure more prominently in 
international comparisons of human development. 
While  fertility  decline requires deep  social transformation  and are therefore less easily 
affected by inflow of money, health outcomes respond more quickly to increase in income no 
matter its source--higher  productivity or rising oil rent.   The oil rich countries have child 
mortality rates (CMR) at levels close to those in developed countries (see Table 4).  In particular, 
low CMR in Oman and Saudi Arabia, the two high income MENA countries with high fertility, 
highlights the anomaly of human development in oil-rich countries.  For purpose of comparison, 
Table 4 includes CMR for Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.  Successful reduction in CMR is noted 
across the board for middle income MENA countries, but not for the low income group.  The 
former group has performed well in health, education, and fertility relative to its income.     
Another distinguishing feature of MENA demography, which is related to high fertility in the 
past, is the unusually large size of the cohorts of young people that have been entering the labor 
and marriage markets in recent years.  Except for the three poorest countries, MENA societies 
have generally provided their youth  with schools and the  incentives to enroll.  As a result, 
education has expanded faster in MENA than in any other region, except East Asia (see Table 5).  
A rapidly increasing educated youth population is generally considered good for growth, but 
because of high rates of unemployment among the region’s youth and low productivity of their 
education  the region may fail to take advantage of its demographic window of opportunity 
(Dhillon and Yousef 2009). 8 
 
3.  The Human Development Index for MENA countries 
How  have  MENA countries performed  relative to other countries in  their development 
experience?   Table 5 shows that the experience of MENA countries, as captured by the HDI, has 
been nearly as diverse as their incomes.  In 1990, the low income MENA countries shared with 
Africa the lowest HDI level but since then have managed to improve faster than all other regions.  
The increase in their HDI was twice as fast as their index of GDP per capita.  The high income 
group did not do as well: in 2007 they enjoyed the second highest income index (0.91), after 
North America (1.01), but their HD index was only the third highest (0.89).  The MENA middle 
income group began the period with a low index of human development (0.64), much lower than 
the Latin American countries (0.73) with similar average income, but was able to partially close 
the gap because its HD index increased faster than the index for LAC.  According to the health 
index, Middle income MENA countries have enjoyed a relatively high level of health over the 
period under consideration while increasing their education index rapidly after starting at a low 
level.  Life expectancy in MENA countries averaged over 71 years in 2007, which is the same as 
the average for non-MENA middle-income countries.
2
To get a more accurate account of the relative performance MENA countries given their 
resources, I compare their HDI index with the conditional average of HDI given GDP per capita.  
In 
 But, as with income, life expectancy had 
enormous variation across the region.   
Figure 1 the straight line is the population weighted regression line of the HDI on the index of 
GDP per capita.
3  This graph shows that, given per capita income, in 1990 all MENA countries 
(with the exception of Jordan) were below the global HDI average, nor is there much 
improvement by 2005.  The same holds for the education index, according to which, in 1990, all 9 
 
MENA countries, again with the exception of Jordan, were below the regression line, indicating 
less education than predicted by their income.  This situation, too, had changed little by 2005.  
The health index for MENA countries is slightly more favorable, according to which Jordan, 
Syria and Tunisia enjoyed higher health status given their income.  The high income countries of 
MENA did particularly poorly in these conditional comparisons.  Correcting for income, they 
lagged in the HDI as well as in its components. 
4.  Youth 
Young people represent a large part of MENA societies.  They are the region’s most educated 
generation  yet, but  face numerous obstacles in their transitions to employment and family 
formation.  Transition to adulthood in MENA is marked by getting a regular job or settling on a 
career, getting married, and moving out of one’s parents’ home.   Worldwide, transitions to 
adulthood are challenging (Lloyd 2005), but MENA youth seem to face greater challenges than 
in other countries: they suffer higher unemployment, longer waiting times for their first job, and 
involuntary delay in marriage.  A  growing literature documents  how  a  combination of 
demographic push (the youth bulge) and inflexible institutions of education and labor market has 
led to the social exclusion of MENA youth (Dhillon and Yousef 2009).   
Youth  from different socio-economic status backgrounds have different experiences in 
transition to adulthood, but share the characteristic of belonging to the largest cohort in their 
countries.  As members of a large demographic group, they suffer from similar labor market 
pressures caused by increase in supply of workers of all skill levels as well as imbalances in the 
marriage and housing markets.
4 Table 7     shows the share of youth in total MENA population by 
country and how it has increased over time; in 2005 it was higher than any other developing 10 
 
regions.  In 1970, the proportion of youth (15-29 years old) in total population in MENA was in 
the range of other developing regions. But, in 2005, it had reached 0.30, which is much higher 
than in Europe and North America (0.21) and higher than developing regions --- Asia (0.26), 
LAC (0.27), and Africa (0.28).
5
 
  The  high  “youth bulge”  has put immense  pressure on the 
region’s labor markets, but it is not the sole cause of youth unemployment.  Because of past 
rapid population growth, the rate at which new workers enter the MENA labor markets has far 
exceeded the rate at which employed workers retire plus new job creation, resulting in increasing 
youth unemployment.  For example, in Iran, the ratio of those who enter the labor market (ages 
20-24) to those who retire (ages 60-64) is 6, compared to 1.2 in the United States.  In 2008, when 
the economy declined and no net new jobs were created, this huge imbalance between the entry 
and exit rates caused youth unemployment rates to jump higher (Salehi-Isfahani 2010).  11 
 
Because it is a cohort phenomenon, in many ways it cuts across social class, affecting 
adversely youth in different backgrounds.  Where economic background seems to matter most is 
in determining how quickly youth transition to a job after leaving school.  Paradoxically, those 
from poor backgrounds and with less education often find jobs faster.  In Iran and Egypt, where 
detailed studies of family background are available, there is a sharp contrast between the 
unemployment rates of youth after leaving school, with the more educated and well off waiting 
longer to take a job (see Assaad et al 2010 and Egel and Salehi-Isfahani 2010).  This puzzle is in 
Box 1.  Youth unemployment in Iran 
Iranian youth aged 15-29 are (in 2010) 35 percent of the total population, which is the highest in any 
country.   They have achieved impressive increase in education, especially women, but face 
inhospitable labor markets.  University educated young men and women have higher 
unemployment rates than those with less education.  Although the government has slowly 
liberalized the formal labor markets, youth still face huge challenges in finding a job after 
graduation.  This figure shows the lopsided nature of unemployment in Iran: the rates are about 5 
percent for workers 30 years and older but several times as high for younger workers.   
   
In fact, the 4 percent rise in overall unemployment during 1996-2006 is entirely from younger ages.  
During this period, the economy grew at a respectable 5 percent per year and the government 
relaxed the labor laws somewhat to allow for short term contracts in the public and private sector, 
which youth took advantage of (Egel and Salehi-Isfahani 2010), but was insufficient to absorb the 
nearly one million new entrants that out-numbered 6 to 1 the retiring cohort of workers. The good 
news is that the so-called “youth bulge” is about to move through, and the rate of entry into the job 
market will decline by 10 percent per year for the next ten years (Salehi-Isfahani 2010). 12 
 
part explained by differences in the reservation wage, which depends on the ability of parents to 
support their children longer at home, or the family’s need for youth labor income.   
How do MENA countries compare to the rest of the world in terms of average employment 
outcomes for youth?   Table 8 presents unemployment rates for  youth (15-24 years old) in 
MENA countries and in the three groups of countries – low-, middle-, and high-income—as 
defined earlier.  In  MENA  countries, during 2005-07 on average  26 percent of youth were 
unemployed, compared to 20 percent for middle income countries, the closest comparison group 
in terms of income for MENA countries.  Low and high income countries had much lower youth 
unemployment rates, 10 and 14 percent, respectively, about twice their overall rates of 
unemployment.  For the middle income group the ratio of youth to overall unemployment is 
about 3.  In MENA this ratio varies widely, with the higher values found in oil-rich countries.  In 
Egypt, Iran, Palestine, and Tunisia youth unemployment rates are the highest in absolute terms 
but not relative to the overall rates.  In Egypt more than three quarters of the unemployed are 
youth under 30; about 70 percent in Iran.   
The more glaring difference between MENA and comparison countries is in the length of 
time high school and college graduates have to wait to find their first job (see studies in Dhillon 
and Yousef 2009, Assaad et al 2010, and Egel and Salehi-Isfahani 2010).  Youth wait a long time 
for their first job, often stretching to several years.  The long gap between leaving school and 
finding the first job is related to the low rate of turnover in MENA formal labor markets, which 
is the destination for most educated MENA youth.  Because of job protection, older employed 
workers (insiders) do not have to compete with new entrants, who are often more educated.   In 13 
 
Iran, the unemployment rate for workers over 30 is low by modern country standards—about 5 
percent—while for workers under 30 it is about 25 percent (see Box 1).   
Added to the difficult transition from school to work is the transition to marriage and family 
formation.  The age at marriage in MENA has been rising for both men and women, and it is not 
all voluntary  or for the “good” reasons, such as aiming for more education, desiring fewer 
children, or wanting to build a career.  High levels of past fertility have created an imbalance in 
the marriage market—“marriage squeeze”—as the larger cohort of women have  reached 
marriage age several years ahead of their male counterparts (Salehi-Isfahani and Egel 2009).  As 
we will see below, to varying degrees there is an excess of men over women and an excess of 
educated women over men in MENA countries.  Social norms regarding marriage in MENA 
countries seem incongruent with the realities of the age and education balance of youth.  The 
social preference for men to marry younger and less educated women contributes to the 
involuntary delay in marriage.   
a.  Education 
Education is an important component of human development in part because it enhances an 
individual’s opportunity set in employment.  But to the extent that education fails to equip a 
person with the skills needed for productive employment, its main purpose to advance human 
development is compromised.  Education is often suggested as a solution to unemployment, but 
in MENA educated youth are often less likely to be employed than the less educated.  For 
example, in Egypt, those with the lowest education have the lowest unemployment (El Hamidi 
and Wahba 2006).  Unemployment is usually highest among secondary school graduates, 
followed by tertiary graduates.   14 
 
Table  10  shows  the average rates of unemployment for  2000-2007 for four groups of 
countries.
6
The low productivity of education in MENA is a well-recognized phenomenon, though there 
is disagreement regarding its source.  Prtichett (1999) and Makdisi et al (2006) find that growth 
of education in MENA does not seem to explain any part of the increase in output.  Two major 
studies of education, AHDR (2003) and World Bank (2007), examine the reasons behind the 
weak performance of education systems in MENA.   The World Bank study emphasizes the role 
of incentives on the part of teachers and school administrators.  It argues, as others have, that the 
strong  role of the  state in provision of education  leads  to distorted incentives,  or lack of 
incentives to promote good education.  The Arab Human Development Report 2004 views the 
problem of knowledge acquisition in the Arab countries in its broader social and political 
  There are several interesting observations that emerge from this table.  First, the rate 
of unemployment falls with education for high income countries and between secondary and 
tertiary for middle income countries, indicating that in these countries, on average, education is 
productive.  Second, compared to other groups, MENA countries had higher unemployment rates 
at all levels of education.  Third, in MENA countries secondary school graduates had the highest 
unemployment rate compared to other education levels.  Fourth, the gap in the unemployment 
rate between MENA and other country groups was largest for tertiary workers, indicating the gap 
in productivity in this category between MENA and the rest of the world.  If we accept that 
lower unemployment rates in the middle and high income countries are indications of higher 
productivity of their educated workers, the fact that MENA workers with secondary and tertiary 
education suffer greater unemployment suggests that education in MENA is less productive than 
elsewhere.  15 
 
context, raising larger issues such as lack of democracy and inequality of wealth as barriers to 
efficient accumulation of human capital.   
A critical issue in the low productivity of MENA education is the narrow focus on testable 
skills.    In the words of Arab Human Development Report  (2003,  p. 83):  “There are entire 
generations of Arabs who have not learnt how to play a musical instrument, and who have not 
read literary works because they were not accustomed to do so in school.  Creative pursuits taken 
for granted in developed country schools have simply been neglected in the Arab world, with 
damaging results to the creative potential of its people.”  The immediate reason for why students 
“are not accustomed” to learn a wider set of skills in MENA schools is that these schools only 
require (and test) a narrow set of skills.  They do a poor job of teaching sports, the arts, and even 
writing ---skills that enhance creativity and productivity ---because these skills are costly to teach 
and test, and the incentives to do so is lacking.  Their main incentive, shared by the students and 
their parents, is to produce a diploma that grants its holder an (ever decreasing) advantage in the 
labor market.  The Arab Human Development Report (2002, p. 61) recognizes this problem and 
offers a solution: “Rather than relying solely on the scores of public examinations, institutions of 
higher education should introduce a system of admission tests, tailored to the needs of each 
institution.”  
   16 
 
b.  Youth labor markets 
There are two characteristics of MENA labor markets that affect youth unemployment.  First, 
their incentive structure promotes acquisition of degrees at the expense of productive skills, 
causing  a  mismatch between what students learn in schools and what is needed in the 
increasingly globalized MENA labor markets.  Second, the reservation wage of their educated 
workers is high, which enables those whose parents can afford (e.g., from middle and upper class 
backgrounds)  to  search longer to find a desirable formal  sector job.  I discuss these 
characteristics in turn. 
The incentive structure is related to the fact that the market for educated labor in MENA has 
been historically dominated by the state (World Bank 2004b).   MENA public sectors have the 
highest share of employment in total (15 percent) and of output (about 10 percent) in the world 
(Schiavo-Campo et al 1997, Salehi-Isfahani 2006).  More recent evidence of the large role of the 
public sector in employment is presented in Table 9, which shows the ratio of the government 
wage bill to GDP for individual MENA countries for which such data are available, as well as 
for the four country groups, averaged over 2000-2008 to expand the number of countries being 
compared.  Relative to their GDP, the wage bill in MENA countries is on average four times 
those of middle income countries.  In addition to being large employers of workers in general, 
public sectors in MENA are the largest employers of educated workers (Assaad 1997, Salehi-
Isfahani 2005), giving power to the public sector in setting the incentives for skill formation in 
formal education. 
The rules governing public employment are not only rigid they often condition employment 
on having a university education.  Furthermore, the regulation of formal private sector 17 
 
employment by labor laws causes private employers to behave in a similar way.  Labor laws 
generally raise the cost of laying off employees.  While this is to a certain extent desirable to 
provide the incentive for both employers and employees to invest in each other, beyond a certain 
level it forces employers to prefer workers with strong ex ante signals of productivity and thus 
favor university-educated youth, and discourages the employees from supplying good effort and 
continue to upgrade their skills (Salehi-Isfahani and Murphy 2004).  The formal private sector 
which is increasingly important in MENA economies is slow to influence the incentive structure 
away from credentials and in the direction of skill formation.  In most advanced economies, a 
diploma is the initial signal to employers that the holder has certain certifiable skills.  The 
diploma is only worth a foot in the door, though, because employers can ascertain for themselves 
once they hire a person what level of skills he or she has.  Some of these skills, such as ambition, 
self-confidence, and teamwork, cannot be certified by schools and are only revealed on the job 
after a period of employment.  Employer who are able  to  base  individual pay and layoff 
decisions a posteriori based on information about the level of productivity that they observe, 
instead of a priori on the level of formal schooling as dictated by a government-set pay scale, 
provide the incentives for investing in non-testable skills.  So, private employer discretion, which 
is much maligned in the literature that evaluated employment contract only by their effect on job 
security for insider workers, is crucial to making education more about skills and less about 
credentials. It is easy to blame publicly run schools for not being responsive to employer needs, 
but even responsive schools fail to teach the right skills, and students and their parents fail to 
demand them, if education is mainly a way to land a public sector job.   
Most studies of education in MENA recognize that MENA education is more about diplomas 
than skill formation.  The origin of diploma seeking behavior in the education system is often 18 
 
traced to the dominant role of state in employment of educated workers (Assaad 1997, Birdsall 
1999).  As the state has raised its requirement for employment, the desired terminal degree which 
was once a high school diploma has now become a university education.  This is the reason why 
in Egypt, where government employment guarantees have done most to promote 
“credentialism”, the share of wage and salary workers with tertiary degrees is much higher than 
in the more economically advanced Turkey -- 29 versus 11 percent (Salehi-Isfahani et al 2009). 
Most MENA countries have engaged in labor market reform of one kind or another.  Egypt, 
where state domination of education and employment of the educated has been the greatest, is 
also the county that has taken the most decisive steps in recent years in labor market reform (see 
Box 2).  The 2003 reform of the labor laws increased the discretion of employers in hiring, firing 
and compensation (Wahba 2009).  In Iran, firms with fewer than 5 workers have been exempted 
from the labor laws but the reforms have stalled in the face of political uncertainty (Salehi-
Isfahani 2005).  Employers in the formal private sector are also permitted to hire workers on 
short term contracts, which have proliferated in recent years (Egel and Salehi-Isfahani 2010).  
Interestingly, in Iran, attempts by the government to increase job security by tight regulation of 
private sector employment have resulted in less, not more, stable contracts.  As a result, the labor 
laws  that do little to protect workers make it harder for employers to reward more skilled 
workers by offering them longer contracts.  The 2003 Egyptian labor market reform that has 
liberalized short term contracts may in this respect fail to serve the need of young workers.   19 
 
   
Box 2.  Mismatch of skills in Egypt 
Compared to the other two large countries of the region, Iran and Turkey, Egypt is poorer and less 
developed but it has the highest ratio of the tertiary educated—29 percent compared to 11 in Iran and 
Turkey.  This undue emphasis has its origin in the incentives for education set by the policies of the 
1960s when the government promised all high school graduates jobs in the public sector. Over time, 
as the public sector has out its ability to absorb educated workers, the promise weakened changed to 
a job guarantee for college graduates and later to long queues for all (Assaad 1997).   
The 600,000 graduates of Egyptian high schools and universities who look for their first job each year 
face a deteriorating labor market condition.   Assaad and Barsoun (2009) present evidence showing 
that the public sector as the most important destination for new labor market entrants has been 
replaced by informal private wage employment, rather than formal private sector jobs (see figure 
below).  While the structure of labor demand has changed, the education system continues to supply 
the market with over a millions of high school and college graduates each year looking for formal 
employment. 
 
As the figure shows, the formal private formal sector has been growing since 1990, possibly aided by 
economic reforms since then.  Hopefully, someday these reforms will lead to the emergence of a 
vigorous private sector capable of competing in the global markets and create enough formal jobs to 
reinvigorate interest in the Egyptian society about investment in human capital at par with the interest 
in formal schooling that the expansion of public employment did decades ago.  To do so, it must do 
more than create jobs for educated workers.  It must also be able to reduce the mismatch of skills by 
influencing the supply side, that is, the type of graduates that the education system produces.  The 
labor market reforms of 2003 have increased the discretion of private employers in rewarding 
productive skills instead of formal credentials.  Gradually, such reforms will shift the incentives of 
families, students, and teachers toward investing in productive skills and away from production of 
diplomas.   
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Source:  Assaad, 2007.20 
 
The distorted incentive structure favors higher degrees at the expense of primary education.  
The market value of primary education appears to be near zero in Egypt (Birdsall 1999) and very 
low in Iran and Turkey (Salehi-Isfahani et al 2009).  The latter study that compared returns 
across  Egypt, Iran and Turkey finds that, unlike in advanced countries, private returns to 
education in these countries increase with the level of schooling.  The authors attribute this 
difference to the fact that in advanced economies education is more aligned with market demand 
for skills while in these economies private returns to lower-level education is only realized if a 
person reaches secondary or tertiary levels.  This is not to say that basic education is a waste of 
time, only that the market reward structure is heavily weighted toward higher degrees. 
The second important reason for high youth unemployment in MENA is a high reservation wage, 
which is due to strong family support for children and, in some countries, the availability of oil 
income.  The persistence of high youth unemployment in the last decade despite robust economic 
growth fueled by the oil boom is related to high expectations of educated youth for formal jobs 
(Razzaz and Iqbal 2008).  In oil rich countries, high unemployment of educated nationals has 
been linked to the rent income that enables youth to wait long for government jobs (Yousef and 
Dyer 2007).  Even n Egypt, which is a poor country by MENA standards, youth unemployment 
is not associated with poverty and low education, suggesting that reservation wage plays a role in 
long searches (Hassan and Sassanpour 2008).  
a.  Marriage and family formation 
Age at marriage has increased sharply in MENA countries, some of which is involuntary.  Delay 
in marriage can be voluntary and in line with human development if it is the result of decline in 
demand for children and increased demand for education, especially by women.  However, 21 
 
involuntary delay can be very costly, especially in MENA societies in which sexual relations 
outside marriage is prohibited legally or by social norms (Singerman 2007). Involuntary delay in 
MENA results from age imbalance in the marriage market and social conventions that raise the 
cost of marriage. 
 
The age at marriage in MENA countries is higher than in other world regions, despite the fact 
that on all related accounts ---fertility, education, and sexual relations before marriage—the 
opposite is expected (Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008).  This suggests that delay in marriage in 
MENA countries is in part involuntary.  An obvious reason is age imbalance in the marriage 
market known as “marriage squeeze.”  This imbalance results from past high fertility, which 
increases the size of cohorts entering marriage age but at different speeds for men and women.  
The larger cohorts of women, born in the high fertility period of the 1980s, have in recent years 
reached marriage age several years ahead of the corresponding larger cohorts of men.  Because 
of the customary age difference of several years, these cohorts of women are matched against the 
smaller cohorts of men born a few years earlier, causing age imbalances as high as 25 percent.  
To get an idea of the size of the age imbalance, Table 11 presents the ratio of men aged 25-29 to 
women  aged 20-24, which assumes a fixed age difference at marriage of five years---a 
reasonable assumption for most MENA countries but not for the more advanced countries in the 
table.   The ratio for the latter group is about unity, while for MENA countries a “shortage of 
men” of 15-25 percent has been the state of the marriage market in recent years (see also box 3).   22 
 
 
Another factor pushing the age of marriage higher is the high cost of marriage, which is 
caused by social conventions regarding bride price that push up the cost of marriage ceremonies 
(Singerman 2007) and the high cost of housing.  An analysis by Assaad and Ramadan (2009) 
shows that the observed decline in age at marriage of Egyptian men is in part due to increased 
Box 3. Marriage squeeze in Iran 
Marriage squeeze is a term used to describe age imbalance in the marriage market.  During period of 
rapid population growth, larger cohorts of women reach marriage age several years ahead of women, 
causing the ratio of marriage age women to men to decline.  The rise and fall of fertility in the early 
1980s in Iran has cause a rather extreme form of this phenomenon.  This figure shows the ratio of 
men 15-29 years old to women 20-24 years old, which represents the imbalance between the supply 
of groom and brides in the marriage market (assuming an age difference of 5 years for married 
couple). 
 
Source: United Nations Population Prospects, 2008. 
It appears that the ratio of men to women has bottomed at about 0.75, and will be rising to 1.4 by 
2020.  The intense pressures from demography have been compounded by high unemployment to 
push the marriage age higher than warranted by the desire for smaller families and more education.  
Such involuntary delay in marriage is particularly costly in Islamic societies such as Iran where relation 
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access to housing resulting from a 1996 housing market reform that made rental housing more 
readily available.   
5.  Women 
MENA societies  (and  sometimes  Muslim societies in general)  have been characterized as 
patriarchal societies in which gender inequities are present in economic, political, social spheres 
(Moghadam 2004).  There are certain aspects of the Islamic law (sharia) that call for an unequal 
treatment of men and women, and furthermore the traditional social norms of the region describe 
women’s role primarily as mothers and homemakers.  However, there is considerable variation 
(e.g., between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia), in the extent to which the sharia influences the laws of 
particular countries and the extent to which gender relations have progressed (Moghadam 2003, 
AHDR 2005).  Even where the unequal treatment at the macro level has not improved by much, 
women have made significant progress in important dimensions of human development, namely 
health and education.  In many MENA countries, notably Iran, Jordan, and Kuwait, women’s life 
expectancy and average years of schooling equal or exceed those of men, and the decline in 
fertility throughout the region has created the basis for more equal status within the family.  
Despite these improvements, full gender equality remains elusive.    
Perhaps the most important manifestation of persisting gender inequality in MENA societies is 
lower participation of women in market work.  This is especially striking because women’s 
participation in market work generally improves with increase in women’s education and decline 
in fertility.  For example, women in Malaysia, a Muslim country, are three to four times as likely 
to engage in market work as women in MENA countries with similar education and fertility, 
such as Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey.   24 
 
MENA countries compare favorably with the rest of the world in terms of the gender gap in 




  As is the case for other country groups in these tables, in MENA countries enrollment 
rates at primary and secondary levels for women and men are similar while women have an edge 
at the tertiary level ( , averages for 2000-2007).   The enrollment rates of MENA women 
is about equal to men in primary (92 percent), lower in secondary (72 vs. 77 percent), but higher 
in tertiary (32 vs. 29 percent).  This is roughly similar to  the situation in middle income 
countries.  Evidently, women have lower dropout rates at the secondary level, which could be 
related to men’s need to work at an earlier age and the fact that for many in the lower rungs of 
the academic ladder a university education does not do much to their employability.  The average 
years of schooling also indicates greater equality in education (Table 13).  Finally, Figure 5 
compares the rate of increase in average years of schooling of men and women in MENA with 
other regions.  It is apparent from the trend line in this figure that, with the exception of East 
Asia, MENA education has expanded faster than other regions, especially for women, who in 
recent years have overtaken men in this respect. 
Despite the rise in education of MENA women relative to their male counterpart in MENA 
and women in other countries, their participation in the labor force remains lower than any 
region (Table 12).  The World Bank (2004) flagship report on gender refers to this phenomenon 
as the “gender paradox”.  The participation rate of women in MENA is 26 percent, compared to 
74 percent for MENA men, and 61 percent for women in middle income countries.
8
Table 3
  Women’s 
low participation in the labor markets in MENA societies is more of a puzzle when we consider 
the fact that, as shown in  , fertility has declined substantially in most MENA countries 
(Salehi-Isfahani 2006).  The links between fertility, women’s education, and women’s labor 25 
 
force participation is well established by historical trends and by micro level studies.  It is 
generally agreed that the relation between economic  development and women’s labor force 
participation  is U-shaped,  as participation initially falls  when  traditional jobs in agriculture 
disappear but eventually rises  as manufacturing and service sectors expand (Goldin 1995, 
Mammen and Paxson 2000).  One difference between the experience of East Asian and MENA 
countries in this respect is the slow replacement of traditional women’s jobs in agriculture and 
manufacturing with modern manufacturing and service jobs in MENA countries.  
This is particularly the case in countries of the MENA region where growth of incomes has 
benefited more from oil money than rising productivity.  This suggests the possibility that, as in 
the case of the long search of MENA youth for appropriate jobs after leaving school, lower 
participation rates of MENA women is in part due to higher reservation wages, which are in turn 
the result of external (oil) income (Salehi-Isfahani 2006).  And, again as in the case of youth, 
patriarchal social norm that define men’s role as the breadwinner and women as home makers 
may also figure in explaining low participation of women in market work (Karshenas 2001).  
The role of social norms is seen also in the low political participation of women in MENA and in 
the segmentation of market work along gender lines (AHDR 2005, Assaad and Barsoum 2007).  
Interestingly, given these social norms, it has been observed that the enforcement of gender 
separation for religious reasons in public spaces can affect women’s human development 
positively (Assaad 2002, Mehran 2003, Salehi-Isfahani 2006).  This phenomenon is yet to be 
established as a causal factor, but it is plausible that under the right circumstances the 
substitution of patriarchy at the level of the state for patriarchy at the level of the family, as for 
example has taken place in Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, can expand women’s 
access to education and work outside the home. 26 
 
Employment is an important component of gender equality and women’s empowerment.  
Evidence from other regions indicates that greater employment opportunities for women can lead 
to greater bargaining power within the family, which can positively affect the distribution of 
household resources in the direction of health and education of children (Thomas 1997, Strauss 
and Thomas 1995, World Bank 2007).  One way to reconcile greater empowerment of MENA 
women as a result of more education and lower fertility with their low participation is to note 
that real change in the economic and social status of women does not follow paid work in 
general, but work in the professions (Goldin and Katz 2001).  In this sense, perhaps the greater 
participation of women in export sector jobs, as in Morocco and Tunisia, and lack thereof in high 
wage MENA economies that benefit from oil money, such as Iran, may not constitute real 
differences in women’s empowerment between these countries.  
Oil income and social norms are likely reasons for the lag in women’s empowerment in the 
Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, where participation rates are less than 10 percent.   In Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, women outnumber men in universities, but their participation in the civic 
and economic life is very limited, as exemplified by the ban on women driving.  But even in this 
narrow geographic area of the Persian Gulf, there is a fair amount of variety in women’s status, 
from the relatively liberal, though small, societies of Bahrain and Dubai to the mixed situation in 
Iran to the conservative Saudi Arabia.   
6.  Poverty and income inequality 
Much of the discussion about human development is conducted on the basis of national averages, 
but, as with income, there are inequalities in various dimensions of human development that 
makes comparison based on averages inaccurate.  I have already discussed an important aspect 27 
 
of MENA inequality, that of gender.  In this section I consider how income inequality may 
change the perception of human development in MENA over time and compared to other 
regions. 
Ideally,  where data permit, comparisons of human development over time and across 
countries should take into account the distributions of human development indicators.  Attempts 
have been made to extend the measurement of human development to include income inequality 
(Hicks 1997), but it has not yet become a systematic part of human development reporting. This 
is in part because international data about distributions of indicators are not as readily available 
as their averages.  For MENA countries, we know very little beyond the inequality of income 
and expenditures (see Bibi and Nabli, 2009, for an excellent review of evidence on inequality of 
income).   
MENA countries are on average more  equal  in terms of income than  middle income 
countries but not low or high income countries (Table 15).  The average Gini coefficient for 
MENA (averages for 2000-2007) is 38.20, compared to 43.56 for middle income countries and 
36.23 for the high income group. Since the majority of MENA countries fall into the middle 
income category, these data indicate that they are on average more equal than other developing 
countries.   
Inequality of income is not necessarily correlated with inequality in other dimensions of 
human development, such as  education and health.  Education and health are in  large part 
publicly provided so their distribution can be more equal than the distribution of income.  In 
most MENA countries education even at the tertiary level is freely provided (though on a 
competitive  and therefore rationed  basis), which should lead to greater equality of years of 28 
 
schooling.   This is clear in the case of Iran, where the distribution of years of schooling has 
improved over time while that of income has not.  For example, the Gini coefficient for years of 
schooling for those above the schooling age (age 24) fell from 0.50 for cohorts born in the 1960s 
to 0.20 for cohorts born in the 1980s  (author’s calculations from survey data).  This decline is in 
contrast with the relatively stable Gini coefficient for the distribution of per capita income and 
expenditures in Iran since the 1970s, which stood between 0.40-0.45 (Salehi-Isfahani 2009).   
The increase in family out-of-pocket expenditures on education, connected to the expansion 
of private schools and private tutoring has created a new source of inequality in education.  For 
example, in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Turkey private tutoring has become an essential part of 
preparation in admission into universities (Assaad and Elbadawy 2007, Hartmann 2007, Tansel 
and Bircan 2004).  These expenditures naturally create inequities in educational achievement as 
the poor are unable to afford these costs and thus may lose in the competition for limited spaces 
in public universities. 
There is less known about the distribution of health outcomes in MENA countries.  A recent 
World Bank (2009) study on MENA health reports that socioeconomic inequities exist in health 
status and the use of health care services.  In most MENA countries the state provides health 
services at some level, but in 10 out of 22 countries households rely heavily on out-of-pocket 
expenditures (defined as 25 percent or more of total health expenditures; see World Bank 2009). 
7.  Civil society and human security issues 
There has been substantial increase in the activities of non-governmental organizations in several 
MENA  countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, that have  helped expand the domain of 29 
 
individual action outside place of work and the family into the society at large.  These activities 
are often viewed from the angle of their opposition to the state and as the main vehicle for 
democratic reform in the region.  With the notable exception of Turkey, there has been little 
improvement in democratic governance MENA societies, so a main goal of human development 
to enable individuals to fully participate in the political life of their countries remains unfulfilled.  
Ultimate decisions about big issues are outside the purview of ordinary citizens.  Yet the opening 
up of the public space to non-governmental activities, where it has occurred, has made a 
significant  difference in the lives of individuals  in terms of serving their needs for civic 
engagement and in policy making outside the realm of the larger political issues that remain the 
prerogative of largely unaccountable political leaders.  The 2003 Arab Human Development 
Report considers civil society as a pillar of human development progress.  Civil society can 
improve human development directly by allowing individuals to express themselves in a social 
context as well as through better policies that fit human development needs. Reform of 
education, employment and family laws can proceed with input from ordinary citizen through 
informal and formal non-governmental associations. 
Another important dimension of human development is human security, which is related to 
several issues discussed in this report, such as health, education and poverty, but goes beyond 
these to include war and destruction and political and domestic violence.  The latest Arab Human 
Development Report (2009) contrasts the emphasis placed in the Arab societies on state security, 
sometimes at the expense of human security.  Arab regimes often use external threats as an 
excuse to limit internal freedoms, which compromises human development in this regard.  
However, authoritarian regimes have also championed populist policies that have improved the 
welfare of the poor, such as land reform, and public health and education.  Land reform and 30 
 
expansion of schooling under Nasser in Egypt, and improvements in child health in Syria (which 
has the lowest child mortality in MENA),  are good examples of the so-called authoritarian 
compact.   In this sense, the tension between the state and individual security is overstated and 
their complementarities ignored.  
8.  Concluding remarks 
MENA countries have achieved much to be proud of in human development.  Falling child 
mortality and fertility have transformed family structures in most MENA countries.  At the level 
of the family the relationship between men and women and parents and children have changed as 
the traditional gender roles have changed.  At least among the rising middle class in the region, 
specialization of women in procreation, having children as a source of support for parents in old 
age, and putting children to work instead of sending them to school have been replaced with new 
roles  --  parents as producers of human capital and the children as the  focus  of family 
investments. 
Despite fundamental positive transformations in health, education, and income, there remain 
certain important aspects of MENA human development that have not progressed as far as these 
aspects.   There are inequalities in human development regionally, within each country and for 
specific demographic groups, most importantly for youth  and women.   Issues of human 
development for youth and women are of special interest because they reveal structural problems 
in MENA societies that inhibit youth and women from leading productive and creative lives in 
accordance with their full potential.  In the case of youth, rising education has not eased the 
transition to adulthood, as indicated by the long spells of unemployment between the time they 
leave school and land their first job and involuntary delay in marriage.  In the case of women, 31 
 
fertility transition and rising education have failed to lead to the greater participation in economic 
and social life of their respective countries.  To remove these barriers MENA societies must 
undertake challenging institutional reforms.  For youth, institutional reform entails improving the 
signals that tell young people what skills to learn, tell firms whom to hire and how much to pay, 
tell credit agencies to whom to lend, and tell families how to evaluate the potential of a young 
person as a future spouse or parent.  In the Middle East many of these signals and incentives are 
skewed, leading to adverse consequences for young people, including a mismatch between those 
skills obtained in the education system and those demanded for jobs in the growing private 
sector.  This requires a greater voice for private employers relative to the traditional employer of 
graduates  –the state--  which has dominated labor markets  in MENA countries since 
independence.   It also requires greater say for private employers in determining individual 
productivity and compensation.  Among policy changes that would remove these distortions are: 
offering greater flexibility in  private sector hiring, compensation, and dismissal practices, 
encouraging "soft skills" formation through university admissions policies, and reforming labor 
and credit markets to promote career trajectories among young people  (Salehi-Isfahani and 
Dhillon 2009). 
To enable women to participate more fully as citizens and productive individuals is more 
complicated because it goes beyond policy reform and involves changes in gender norms.   As 
the traditional roles for women as mothers and homemakers places less and less demand on their 
time, avenues for civic and economic participation must be found outside the home to help them 
reach their full potential as contributors to the modern society.  In this regard, policies that make 
labor markets more hospitable for women would help not only with increasing their labor force 32 
 
participation directly, but also indirectly as it helps change the norms that inhibit their work 
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Tables 
Table 1.  The list of countries in MENA categories 




MENA high income 
Algeria  Djibouti  Algeria  Bahrain 
Bahrain  Sudan  Egypt  Kuwait 
Egypt  Yemen  Iran   Libya 
Iran    Iraq  Oman 
Iraq    Jordan  Qatar 
Jordan    Lebanon  Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait    Morocco  United Arab Emirates 
Lebanon    Palestine   
Libya    Syria   
Morocco    Tunisia   
Palestine    Turkey   
Oman       
Qatar       
Saudi Arabia       
Sudan       
Syria       
Tunisia       
United Arab Emirates       




Table 2.  Per capita GDP in MENA region, 1990-2005 
Region  1990  1995  2000  2007 
          MENA-low  1,011  1,119  1,334  1,880 
MENA-mid  5,244  5,562  6,226  7,842 
MENA-high  20,474  21,765  22,300  26,959 
Africa  1,688  1,553  1,589  1,929 
Asia  2,649  3,211  3,684  5,184 
LAC  7,102  7,679  8,268  9,631 
Oceania  18,126  19,109  21,656  24,113 
Europe  16,429  15,680  17,908  21,712 
N. America  31,454  33,249  38,472  42,442 
Note: Population weighted averages, in PPP USD. 38 
 
Table 3. Total Fertility Rates for selected countries and regions 
  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015 
Algeria  4.13  2.89  2.53  2.38  2.26  2.16 
Egypt  3.91  3.50  3.16  2.89  2.68  2.51 
Iran  3.95  2.50  2.12  1.83  1.74  1.79 
Iraq  5.80  5.40  4.63  4.11  3.66  3.26 
Jordan  5.14  4.32  3.53  3.13  2.81  2.54 
Kuwait  3.20  2.61  2.30  2.18  2.09  2.01 
Lebanon  3.00  2.70  2.09  1.86  1.85  1.85 
Libya  4.10  3.41  3.03  2.72  2.47  2.26 
Morocco  3.66  2.97  2.52  2.38  2.26  2.16 
Oman  6.30  5.10  3.80  3.09  2.84  2.64 
Palestine  6.46  6.03  5.63  5.09  4.50  3.93 
Qatar  4.10  3.38  2.92  2.43  2.27  2.17 
Saudi 
Arabia 
5.45  4.62  3.81  3.17  2.83  2.56 
Syria  4.86  4.02  3.64  3.29  2.93  2.64 
Tunisia  3.13  2.32  1.97  1.86  1.82  1.80 
Turkey  2.90  2.57  2.23  2.13  2.04  1.97 
UAE  3.88  2.97  2.49  1.95  1.88  1.85 
Yemen  7.70  6.73  5.90  5.30  4.65  4.08 
Asia  3.01  2.69  2.50  2.35  2.26  2.18 
Africa  6.08  5.72  5.41  5.08  4.66  4.20 
Source: United Nations, Population Prospects, 2008 revision. 
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Table 4. Child mortality rates for selected countries and regions 
  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015 
Algeria  52.0  41.0  33.0  27.3  23.0 
Egypt  57.7  46.7  40.7  34.7  29.3 
Iran  52.0  41.0  34.0  27.7  23.0 
Iraq  55.7  45.0  40.7  36.0  34.0 
Jordan  32.0  26.0  21.7  18.0  15.7 
Kuwait  12.0  11.0  10.0  9.30  9.00 
Lebanon  33.3  29.7  26.0  22.0  19.7 
Libya  26.3  23.0  19.7  17.0  15.0 
Morocco  59.0  45.7  36.0  29.3  24.3 
Oman  23.0  17.3  13.7  11.7  11.0 
Palestine  30.0  24.3  20.3  17.3  15.0 
Qatar  15.3  12.0  10.0  9.00  9.00 
Saudi Arabia  31.0  26.0  21.7  18.7  16.3 
Syria  28.0  21.7  18.3  16.0  14.0 
Tunisia  30.0  25.0  22.3  19.0  16.7 
Turkey  47.7  36.3  31.7  27.0  23.7 
UAE  13.0  11.3  11.0  10.0  9.3 
Yemen  112.0  95.3  78.7  63.7  51.0 
Asia  73.3  65.3  58.3  52.0  46.3 
Africa  176.0  160.7  147.7  133.3  119.7 
Source: UNDP   40 
 
Table 5.  HDI index and its components 
  HDI  GDP pc Index 
  1990  1995  2000  2007  1990  1995  2000  2007 
MENA-
low  0.42  0.45  0.48  0.53  0.38  0.4  0.43  0.49 
MENA-
mid  0.64  0.67  0.71  0.75  0.65  0.66  0.68  0.71 
MENA-
high  0.80  0.83  0.85  0.89  0.88  0.89  0.89  0.92 
Africa  0.43  0.43  0.45  0.49  0.41  0.39  0.40  0.42 
Asia  0.58  0.62  0.66  0.71  0.45  0.5  0.54  0.61 
LAC  0.73  0.76  0.79  0.82  0.7  0.72  0.72  0.75 
Oceania  0.89  0.92  0.95  0.97  0.81  0.83  0.84  0.85 
Europe  0.84  0.83  0.85  0.88  0.83  0.8  0.83  0.87 
N. 
America  0.92  0.93  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.97  1.00  1.01 
                 
  Education Index  Health Index 
  1990  1995  2000  2007  1990  1995  2000  2007 
MENA-
low  0.42  0.46  0.50  0.55  0.47  0.50  0.54  0.57 
MENA-
mid  0.59  0.65  0.70  0.75  0.66  0.71  0.74  0.77 
MENA-
high  0.75  0.79  0.82  0.86  0.73  0.77  0.79  0.82 
Africa  0.47  0.5  0.54  0.61  0.42  0.41  0.41  0.44 
Asia  0.63  0.68  0.72  0.77  0.65  0.67  0.70  0.73 
LAC  0.78  0.82  0.86  0.89  0.72  0.75  0.78  0.81 
Oceania  0.91  0.97  1.02  1.02  0.79  0.81  0.83  0.86 
Europe  0.91  0.93  0.94  0.96  0.79  0.79  0.80  0.83 
N. 
America  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.97  0.84  0.86  0.88  0.90 
Note: Population weighted averages. 
Source: UNDP. 
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Table 6.  Growth rates of HDI and its components by region, 19990-2005 
Region  HDI  GDP pc  Education   Health 
MENA-low  0.16  0.07  0.29  0.20 
MENA-mid  0.14  0.04  0.26  0.15 
MENA-high  0.08  0.01  0.14  0.10 
Africa  0.12  0.01  0.37  0.10 
Asia  0.16  0.11  0.24  0.14 
LAC  0.09  0.02  0.13  0.11 
Oceania  0.08  0.03  0.12  0.10 
Europe  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.03 
N. America  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.07 
Note: Average growth rates over the 15 year period 1990- 2005. 
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Table 7.  Youth ratios in selected Middle Eastern countries and other regions 
  1970  1990  2000  2005  2015 
Algeria  0.23  0.28  0.31  0.32  0.27 
Djibouti  0.27  0.28  0.28  0.29  0.30 
Egypt  0.26  0.26  0.28  0.3  0.27 
Iran  0.26  0.27  0.33  0.36  0.27 
Iraq  0.25  0.28  0.29  0.28  0.29 
Jordan  0.27  0.29  0.31  0.30  0.28 
Kuwait  0.29  0.28  0.27  0.28  0.23 
Libya  0.26  0.29  0.34  0.32  0.24 
Morocco  0.23  0.28  0.30  0.30  0.27 
Oman  0.27  0.25  0.30  0.30  0.29 
Qatar  0.30  0.23  0.23  0.32  0.23 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.26  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.27 
Sudan  0.26  0.27  0.28  0.28  0.29 
Syria  0.25  0.27  0.31  0.32  0.28 
Tunisia  0.23  0.28  0.29  0.30  0.26 
Turkey  0.25  0.29  0.30  0.28  0.25 
UAE  0.32  0.26  0.30  0.32  0.23 
Yemen  0.26  0.26  0.27  0.29  0.30 
MENA  0.25  0.27  0.30  0.30  0.27 
Africa  0.26  0.27  0.28  0.28  0.28 
Asia  0.25  0.29  0.27  0.26  0.25 
Europe  0.22  0.22  0.21  0.21  0.18 
LAC  0.26  0.28  0.28  0.27  0.25 
N. America  0.24  0.23  0.21  0.21  0.2 
Oceania  0.25  0.26  0.23  0.22  0.22 
Notes: The ratio of youth ages 15-29 to total population. 
Source: UN 2008 Population Prospects. 
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Table 8.  Youth unemployment in selected countries, ages 15-29 
  Youth   Overall  Youth/ 
Overall  
Algeria  22.3  21.70  1.03 
Bahrain  20.1  5.50  3.65 
Egypt  24.8  10.16  2.44 
Iran  23.0  11.27  2.04 
Iraq  --  10.53  -- 
Jordan  22.2  14.95  1.48 
Kuwait  5.3  1.12  4.73 
Lebanon  17.4  8.08  2.15 
Morocco  18.3  11.07  1.65 
Palestine  35.7  23.61  1.51 
Qatar  5.4  3.90  1.38 
Saudi Arabia  16.3  5.25  3.10 
Syria  16.5  8.96  1.84 
Tunisia  27.3  14.84  1.84 
Turkey  19.6  9.51  2.06 
UAE  7.6  2.71  2.80 
MENA  25.9  11.14  2.32 
Low income  9.9  4.88  2.03 
Middle 
income 
19.6  6.58 
2.98 
High income  13.6  6.68  2.04 
Notes: Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 2005 PPP US dollars:  Low income: 
less than $3000; middle income: $3000-$15000; high income: greater than $15000. 
Source: Country groups are from WDI (ages 15-24), average 2000-07; MENA countries from 
Brookings, MEYI website. 
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Table 9.  The ratio of the government wage bill to GDP (percent) 
Country  No. of countries  Ratio  GDP per capita 
Algeria    5.82  6815 
Bahrain    12.09  25330 
Egypt    7.73  4342 
Iran    8.98  9077 
Jordan    16.35  4212 
Morocco    13.19  3515 
Oman    8.64  18570 
Qatar    6.46  62585 
Tunisia    11.19  6296 
Turkey    5.53  10429 
       
Income group       
MENA  18  8.38  8518 
Low income  57  2.01  1760 
Middle income  61  2.02  5623 
High income  44  4.30  31715 




Table 10.  Unemployment rates by education, average 2000-2007 
  No. of 
countries 
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
MENA  15  11.28  15.68  13.67 
Low income  27  5.14  7.30  8.94 
Middle income  50  10.33  12.90  9.53 
High income  42  10.28  6.93  4.48 
Note: Population weighted averages. Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 2005 
PPP US dollars:  Low income less than $3000; middle income $3000-$15000; high income 
greater than $15000. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Bank WDI data set.   45 
 
Table 11. Marriage squeeze: the ratio of men 25-29 to women 20-24 
Year  1970  1990  2000  2005  2015  2025 
Algeria  0.65  0.87  0.88  0.88  1.08  0.98 
Djibouti  0.75  0.81  0.85  0.85  0.92  0.98 
Egypt  0.69  0.86  0.78  0.82  1.13  0.93 
Iran  0.78  0.86  0.76  0.75  1.32  0.93 
Iraq  0.96  0.74  0.88  0.93  0.90  0.99 
Jordan  0.96  0.81  0.95  0.92  0.99  1.01 
Kuwait  1.47  1.60  2.09  2.00  1.61  1.30 
Libya  1.00  0.89  0.88  0.89  1.14  0.95 
Morocco  0.73  0.83  0.81  0.77  0.99  1.01 
Oman  0.81  1.37  1.37  1.14  1.33  1.26 
Qatar  3.33  3.08  2.63  4.50  4.97  3.33 
Saudi Arabia  0.96  1.41  1.34  1.40  1.08  1.13 
Sudan  0.83  0.84  0.86  0.87  0.89  0.97 
MENA  0.78  0.86  0.84  0.86  1.06  0.98 
Africa  0.82  0.83  0.81  0.83  0.90  0.89 
Asia  0.89  0.92  1.06  0.96  1.09  1.11 
Europe  0.86  1.09  1.05  1.02  1.24  1.07 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.82  0.89  0.89  0.92  0.97  1.01 
N. America  0.82  1.18  1.06  1.01  1.05  1.08 
Oceania  0.88  1.01  1.05  0.96  1.00  1.05 
Source: UN Population Prospects, 2008 revision.    46 
 
 
Table 12.  Comparison of MENA enrollment rates with the rest of the world (percent) 



















Primary  92.4  80.0  92.9  95.5  92.6  84.4  93.6  95.0 
Secondary  72.3  31.2  68.1  92.0  77.2  34.7  68.2  91.4 
Tertiary  31.7  7.2  29.8  77.1  29.1  10.4  26.8  63.0 
Labor force 
participation  26.4  45.0  61.4  52.7  74.2  81.4  78.7  69.4 
Notes: Population weighted averages.  Enrollment rates are percent of age group (net).  
Participation is percent of labor force economically active.  Country classification is based on 
GDP per capita in 2005 PPP US dollars:  Low income: less than $3000; middle income: $3000-
$15000; high income: greater than $15000. 
Source: World Bank WDI 2008. 
 
Table 13.  Gender and education: Average years of schooling for selected MENA and 
groups of non-MENA countries 
  Men    Women 
  1990  1995  2000    1990  1995  2000 
Bahrain  8.80  8.90  9.00    9.60  10.10  10.10 
Egypt  6.60  7.30  7.70    6.60  6.80  8.10 
Iran  7.30  8.20  8.40    6.90  8.20  8.50 
Jordan  8.00  8.80  8.90    8.20  8.90  9.80 
Morocco  4.90  5.60  6.80    4.30  5.10  6.00 
Saudi Arabia  7.10  8.00  8.20    7.00  8.10  9.10 
Syria  4.40  4.50  4.80    5.50  5.50  5.80 
Turkey  5.30  5.80  5.20    5.70  6.10  7.00 
Low income  4.76  5.09  5.45    4.85  5.25  5.71 
Middle 
income 
7.97  8.21  8.28    8.23  8.62  9.31 
High income  8.98  9.08  9.25    10.32  10.58  10.96 
Notes: Population weighted averages.   Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 
2005 PPP US dollars:  Low income: less than $3000; middle income: $3000-$15000; high 
income: greater than $15000. 
Source: IIASA data set. 
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Table 14.  Gender and life expectancy for MENA and country groups. 
  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2007 
Men and women             
MENA  48.4  54.0  59.7  65.5  69.9  71.8 
Low income  42.3  47.9  53.2  56.9  59.3  61.4 
Middle income  44.2  61.2  64.6  67.6  70.0  71.6 
High income  68.9  70.9  73.4  75.6  77.9  79.4 
             
Women             
MENA  49.3  55.1  61.2  67.5  71.7  73.7 
Low income  42.2  48.0  53.7  57.7  60.5  62.7 
Middle income  45.7  62.9  66.8  70.0  72.6  74.2 
High income  71.8  74.2  77.0  79.2  81.0  82.4 
             
Men             
MENA  47.5  52.9  58.3  63.6  68.1  69.9 
Low income  42.4  47.8  52.8  56.1  58.1  60.1 
Middle income  42.8  59.5  62.5  65.3  67.6  69.1 
High income  66.2  67.7  70.1  72.3  74.9  76.6 
Notes: Population weighted averages.  Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 2005 
PPP US dollars:  Low income: less than $3000; middle income: $3000-$15000; high income: 
greater than $15000. 
Source: World Bank, WDI, 2008. 
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Table 15.  Inequality for selected MENA countries and regions 
Country  Gini Coefficient 
Algeria  n.a. 
Bahrain  n.a. 
Djibouti  39.96 
Egypt  32.45 
Iran  38.28 
Iraq  n.a. 
Jordan  38.30 
Kuwait  n.a. 
Lebanon  n.a. 
Libya  n.a. 
Morocco  40.76 
Oman  n.a. 
Palestine  n.a. 
Qatar  n.a. 
Saudi Arabia  n.a. 
Sudan  n.a. 
Syria  n.a. 
Tunisia  40.81 
Turkey  42.97 
UAE  n.a. 
Yemen  37.69 
MENA  38.20 
Low income  37.57 
Middle income  43.56 
High income  36.23 
Notes: Averages of reported Gini coefficients for 2000-07, population weighted. 
Source: World Bank, WDI 2008. 
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Figure 2.  The education index of MENA countries in relation to per capita GDP 
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Figure 3.  The health index of MENA countries in relation to per capita GDP 
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Figure 4.  Women’s labor force participation
 
Note: The partial relation between female labor force participation rate and log GDP per capita, 
controlling for female secondary and tertiary enrollment. 
 Figure 5.  Years of schooling have increased faster in MENA than other regions 
 
Notes: Average years of schooling for both sexes, except for MENA 
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Figure 6. Total fertility rates 
 
                                                           
1 See Table 1 for the list definitions of the categories used in this section.  All countries normally considered in the 
Middle East and North Africa region are included in this study, including Turkey. 
2 Middle income for non-MENA countries is defined between $3000-$15000 GDP per capita values (PPP values for 
2005), in which most MENA countries fall.  All averages are population weighted. Source of data: World Bank WDI 
2008.   
3Regressing on the HDI index of GDP per capita, which is limited from above to 100, produces the same results as 
regressing on log GDP per capita, so there is no difficulty of interpretation.  
4 For the effect of cohort size on welfare, see Easterlin (1987). 
5 The youth ratio for the oil-rich nations includes foreign workers, so this analysis may not apply.   
6 Averages over a number of years yield data for a larger number of countries. 
7 The most relevant comparisons in these tables should be made with the group of 62 “middle income countries,” 
defined for this study with PPP GDP per capita between 3000 and 15000 (this corresponds roughly to the middle 
income definition that the World Bank uses but based on 2008 GDP pc between $1000-12,000).  The table includes 
lower income (less than $3000) and upper income (greater than $15,000).  Primary and secondary enrollment 
rates are net but tertiary rates are gross (source: WDI database).  
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MENA
Low income
Middle income
High income